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T
he rise of digital platforms and the emergence 
of over the top (OTT) providers have helped 
shape an environment where services are 
becoming increasingly detached from the 
underlying infrastructure used to deliver them. This 
presents challenges for communications regulation. 
In this environment, we might expect intense 
focus on regulatory design – on adapting the 
regulatory framework to meet contemporary 
conditions. But an early spurt of interest in 
replacing regulatory “silos” with cross-platform 
regulation designed for a converged 
communications environment appears to have 
stalled. In this article, we review the position of the 
“layered model” of communications as a framework 
for regulatory design, and ask whether it is still as 
attractive as it once seemed – whether such a model 
is equipped to provide a framework for policy and 
regulatory analysis in an environment where 
platforms and providers can supply services at more 
than one layer, or can move to deliver a service over 
a layer with a lower regulatory burden and cost. 
THE LAYERED MODEL
The changing communications environment, 
characterised by rapid technological change, the 
ubiquity and speed of broadband networks, 
increasingly sophisticated consumer devices, 
miniaturisation, and virtualisation of physical 
infrastructure, was brought into sharp relief by the 
recent review of Australia’s communications 
regulator, the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ACMA), undertaken by the 
Department of Communications and the Arts.  
The first recommendation of the 2017 ACMA review1 
was that the ACMA remit should “cover all the 
layers of the communications market, including 
infrastructure, transport, devices, content and 
applications”. 
In Australia at least, the layered approach to 
communications underpins discussions about the 
future of the regulatory regime. A layered model for 
regulation has been defined as establishing a “set of 
layers, each with its own set of permitted functions, 
to serve as a guide to regulatory decision-making”.2 
The model has been advocated by theorists, e.g. 
Richard Whitt, who wrote:3
“...a layers model can assist policymakers in targeting 
regulation to foster needed competition at the core (or lower 
layers) of the network, while preserving and enhancing 
innovation at the edge (or upper layers)... the layers analysis 
offers a fresh and compelling way to look at legacy US legal 
and regulatory policies.”
The layered approach can be contrasted with the 
“siloed” approach that characterises regulation in 
Australia, but also with the EU regulatory 
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framework based on “two directives that cover 
transmission networks and services, as well as 
information society services, but not the content  
of the services delivered over those networks”.4 The 
EU framework separates information services from  
the underlying network. Comparing the layered 
approach to an EU regulatory framework, the 
conclusion is that a layered model allows for “more 
refined classification and granular treatment 
among services”.4 
Initially grounded in the OSI layer model 
published in 1984, this model has been adapted  
and simplified into models containing fewer  
layers for regulatory and policy analysis: content, 
applications, logical layer (IP) and the physical 
layer.3 This is the most common breakdown of the 
layered model in use in regulatory frameworks.2,5 
There are other versions of the layered model, but 
they are essentially similar. The full OSI model has  
7 layers (see graphic). 
There is a view that regulation should be based on 
the principle of layer separation – minimising “layer 
crossing” – to ensure there is a direct connection 
between the “layer at which the law aims to 
produce an effect and the layer directly affected by 
regulation”.6 More recently, Yao-kuo Chiang echoes 
the view that layer crossing should be avoided.7
The ACMA presented a shortened version of the 
layered approach in its “broken concepts” report, as 
well as in a follow-up paper, where it considered 
emerging challenges with concepts underpinning 
telecoms regulation in Australia.8 The diagram  
(page 15) shows the version of the layered model 
used in the ACMA’s report, as well as the previous 
siloed approach. 
An inherent benefit of the layered model is the 
ability to separate out content from the transport 
infrastructure used to convey that content. The 
model also recognises the engineering reality of 
how communications and the internet IP stack 
operate, and it has the potential for application 
across IP-based broadcasting services and telecoms 
regulation. The ACMA notes that the layered 
approach “allows for a targeted policy approach 
that applies legislative, regulatory or other controls 
at the appropriate point in the service and/or 
content delivery stack”.8 
In favouring the layered approach, the 
Department of Communications uses the ACMA’s 
simplified model, but it combines applications and 
content, and adds a devices layer in the ACMA 
review report. The collapsing of applications and 
content layers is not present in ACMA writing in the 
lead-up to the report, and it is not fully explained. 
Devices are defined as being “an essential means to 
access communications networks. Devices include 
televisions, radios, mobile phones and tablets.” The 
ACMA review report recognises the growing and key 
role of devices, and their facilitation of greater 
mobility. However, there is limited detail on the 
addition of the devices layer, other than that it 
forms an important layer in the stack from 
infrastructure through to content. In its first 
submission to the review, the ACMA discusses the 
implications of the internet of things (IoT), with its 
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reliance on devices: “Such developments potentially give rise to 
massive numbers of connected devices generating huge quantities of 
data that may be collected, analysed and further utilised.”
The common approach of collapsing the layered model into four 
layers has been critiqued on the basis that it “deprives the layer model 
of much of its analytical power and misperceives the network layer’s 
function as the basis for universal connectivity”, as Christopher Yoo 
says.5 As he adds, the separation of the transport and network layers is 
one of the key architectural decisions underpinning the internet. 
Others argue that the model has been widely misunderstood and 
misrepresented in its application, not helped by the multiple 
variations on the original OSI model.9 This is an aspect that Australian 
regulators will have to confront if the applications and content 
combination is to be enacted. 
The ACMA has noted five key enablers of the internet economy: 
infrastructure, devices, services/apps, digital information/digital 
content, and user interactions with these elements, and in a 
submission in response to a draft of the ACMA review report, the 
ACMA supports the use of a layered approach “to identify the scope of 
government interest in the communications sector”.10 The ACMA 
further notes that it provides the flexibility to “manage the transition 
from existing legislation” and to “accommodate new developments in 
media and communications”. 
CRITIQUES OF THE LAYERED MODEL
Engineering bias. It has been said that the layered model derives 
from an engineering model for IP communications. While this has 
worked well for network design, this does not smoothly translate into 
a foundation for public policy on communications regulation.  
Further, an end-user might expect a model to be designed from their 
perspective, or at least from that of a regulator, rather than that of an 
engineer. David Reed notes, “What is good for the engineer is not easily 
applicable to the regulator, at least not in terms of adoption of a rigid 
framework required for consistent regulatory decision-making.”2  
The engineering bias inherent in the layered model also means that 
engineering concepts are sometimes offered as “substitutes for 
conventional tools of policy analysis”.5 The layered model has been 
invoked in the context of justifying regulation for the lower levels of 
the stack, leaving the upper levels free from scrutiny. 
Related to the engineering bias criticism is the failure to recognise 
the roles of institutions “involved in the regulation/legal/political 
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industry and how it works”.11 Martin Fransman 
writes that these institutions could be included in 
the overall “analytical framework” missing from the 
layered model.11 Others attempt to address these 
shortcomings in the layered model as follows:4
“First, implementation and enforcement of the layered 
model itself will result from dynamic legal and regulatory 
processes. Secondly, financial markets are tremendously 
influential through the availability of capital investment 
funds… Thirdly, innovation and standards processes led  
by universities and standards bodies yield tremendous 
influence, e.g. advancing technology, establishing 
interconnection rules that affect service provider 
interactions. Fourthly, demand drivers for the services 
reflected by the layers are an important influence.”
While the layered model may omit the effects of 
these institutions, their influence on the market 
and regulatory environment, and interactions 
between them and service providers, the model  
does benefit from its simplicity – a trade-off 
acknowledged by Fransman.
Inflexibility. Fransman also notes that a layered 
model is “essentially static in that it does not 
include processes of change and their causes”, and 
so it requires an “additional analytical framework”. 
This framework should be designed to enable 
understanding of the processes of change in the 
communications industry, identifying the “prime 
movers”. In his 2002 article Fransman makes no 
further attempt to define what this framework 
might look like. The layered model presupposes that 
“the current layered structure of network systems, 
namely those based upon the internet, will remain 
relatively stable in the foreseeable future”.2 
The New Millennium Research Council (NMRC) 
argues that “as technology develops, it is not 
necessarily following the prescripts of the network 
layers model. There may, indeed, be valid economic 
and technological reasons for bundling applications 
or integrating between layers”.12 Rapid 
technological change has shown that systems, and 
their underlying models, can adapt.
While the layered model is relatively good at 
accounting for differences between layers, it is  
poor at accounting for differences within layers:  
e.g. differences between fixed and mobile networks, 
or between local access networks and the core 
network, within the network layer, says Fransman.
Chiang notes the importance of flexibly applying 
the layered model, arguing that the model should 
be used as a structured lens through which to 
evaluate providers, and not as a new model for 
regulation. In his view, based on analysis of reforms 
in Malaysia, the UK and Taiwan, the layered model 
was not intended to entirely replace the previous 
siloed approach. The layered model “is an analytical 
tool for policy considerations, not a regulatory 
framework”, and to apply it as the basis for 
communications regulation would lead to failure.7
An additional criticism is that in regulating based 
on layers, the model encourages the creation of 
artificial barriers between layers, leading to undue 
restrictions on larger players in the market which 
would ordinarily be vertically integrated. In turn, this 
could result in poorer cost outcomes for consumers.12
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Innovation. Reed contends that the layered model 
can have a stifling effect on innovation – “regulatory 
oversight and approval processes will hinder 
deployment and development of new capabilities 
and services based on cross-layer technologies”.2 
Having artificial barriers, or differences in 
regulation between layers, could lead to a developer 
choosing not to innovate across layers in platforms 
and/or technology. If one layer is subject to a less 
hostile regulatory regime, the incentive is to 
develop at the less regulated layer, which may not 
result in the best or most cost-effective solution for 
the end-user.
The layered model can allow for regulation to be 
“compartmentalised and minimised by targeting 
only the appropriate layer”.9 In practice, with 
reference to the Sicker-Mindel-Cooper (SMC) model, 
this may unduly favour the application layer, 
advantaging OTT players. In turn, this disadvantages 
infrastructure providers, and does not encourage 
innovation at the 
transport or physical end 
of the stack. This bias is 
also evident in the ACMA 
review: “The bottom 
layers are the most scale 
and capital intensive (e.g. 
infrastructure owners), 
while the upper layers  
are more innovation 
intensive (e.g. applications and content).” There is 
limited consideration of whether this must always 
be the case, and whether the lower layers are 
doomed to lack innovation. The NMRC argues that:12
“By isolating the physical infrastructure layer and 
imposing restrictive regulatory rules on its owner, 
opportunities for an important source of network 
innovation may be lost. Quarantined to the physical layer, 
and constrained in its profitability, the infrastructure 
provider foresees insufficient return to justify the enormous 
investment that often is necessary to retrofit an embedded 
network for a new technology.”
Market power and competition. Douglas Sicker 
and Joshua Mindel argue that “the main advantage 
of a layered policy approach is that it creates a level 
playing field for regulated entities and services, 
avoiding inconsistencies” – which may not always 
be beneficial if policymakers are aiming to make 
decisions designed to affect specific markets.13 
Theorists acknowledge that the siloed model of 
communications regulation encouraged “system 
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Moving up the stack, the innovators are often 
global corporate entities that may be harder to 
regulate effectively due to jurisdictional and conflict 
of laws issues. In addition, more virtualisation 
higher up the stack – including for services that 
were often provided by infrastructure further down 
the stack, such as networking-as-a-service and cloud 
services, creates greater 
difficulties for the 
application of a 
traditional layered model.
Regulating on the basis 
of layers can result in 
services being provided at 
a layer that is subject to 
the least onerous 
regulation, as compliance 
will generally be a cost. Although regulators would 
not wish to have this role, a market response to 
differential regulation at different layers could leave 
regulators “placed in the key role of designing the 
layered networks systems through their frequent 
regulatory decisions”.2 The ACMA has acknowledged 
this challenge, with IoT “creating an even more 
complex communications environment in which 
network elements can and are being emulated in 
software (‘virtualisation’), leading to more 
sophisticated and subtle interconnection between 
networks, devices, services and content.”
Criticisms are noted of the SMC version of the 
layered model: it can hinder vertical integration and 
erect effective barriers between layers, and preclude 
realisation of economies of scale and scope “across 
the unbundled interfaces”.9 The layered model can 
also result in unreasonably burdensome regulation 
at the transport layer.12 
In rejecting these criticisms of their layered 
model, Sicker and Lisa Blumensaadt argue that, on 
the contrary, in allowing regulation to be more 
targeted, the layered approach will not stifle 
innovation in cross-layer technologies nor prevent 
the realisation of economies of scale. They also take 
the view that the layered model does not affect 
structural separation.9
While vertical integration can have both positive 
and negative effects on economic efficiency, Sicker 
and Mindel say that “serious problems arise when a 
dominant provider can assert their control of 
multiple layers or combine their layers with those 
of other providers in an exclusionary and 
anticompetitive manner”.13 Problems emerge where 
a provider has control of a whole layer, e.g. physical 
access with a historical monopoly, and then charges 
significant sums to give other providers access.
Regulating ownership across layers raises 
additional policy challenges. The fact that the 
layered model discourages vertical integration is 
seen by some as a weakness of the model, e.g. NMRC 
argues that the model ignores potential benefits to 
consumers of vertical integration and cross-
subsidising provision of services across layers.12
THE ROLE OF PLATFORMS
Recent writing has also examined the crucial role of 
platforms in the communications environment, 
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gaming by stakeholders”, with providers becoming 
“quite adept at manipulating this regulatory system 
with an eye toward accruing cost savings by 
qualifying for less-burdensome regulatory 
requirements”.14 However, it is not clear that the 
layered model avoids this problem, or whether it 
can exacerbate it.
Reed reveals some bias, viewing the market as  
the rightful arbiter of the “technical winners and 
losers”, with the layered model sacrificing 
“technical neutrality”. He contends that “the 
imposition of open access requirements on facilities-
based carriers ultimately perverts the true price of 
various elements by regulatory machination with 
the overall result of inefficiency”. Reed also views 
the layered approach as unnecessarily focused on 
unbundling the service from the infrastructure.2
Yoo acknowledges a beneficial effect of the 
layering model on competition, while also noting 
negative effects, coming to the view that layering 
does not necessarily promote competition.5 A 
traditional focus of regulation at the lower levels of 
the stack can also allow for market power to be 
exercised at the upper layers without appropriate 
regulatory scrutiny or oversight. The increasingly 
globalised nature of operations, as we move up the 
stack and the service becomes more remote from 
the underlying infrastructure, also contributes to 
this challenge for regulators. 
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That the layered 
model discourages 
vertical integration 
is seen by some as  
a weakness.
In its 2011 report,8 the ACMA used the example 
of the “standard telephone service” (STS) to 
highlight difficulties with legacy concepts. The 
STS, which fits under “voice services”, is under 
siege from convergence and the increasing role 
of VoIP services – typically provided by overseas-
based OTT entities. Nonetheless, the ACMA said 
it remains “the principal legislative anchor for a 
range of consumer safeguards”. 
The STS concept is based on a “single unitary 
concept of an STS” that “does not reflect well the 
characteristics by which services can now be 
differentiated. Voice services may now be offered 
over a range of platforms using a number of 
different protocols.” For example, VoIP services 
often do not have the characteristics of an STS 
as defined by the siloed model, and so may not 
be caught by consumer safeguards, such as the 
requirement to provide a capability to call  
“triple zero”.
The STS concept is designed for a “vertically 
integrated industry environment, with the 
emphasis on a specific service type tied to a 
particular network type” (e.g. PSTN). In the current 
environment, communications services can be 
provided by an OTT entity, operating only at the 
higher layers of the stack. Many of the difficulties 
government and industry experience with the 
STS concept stem from its origins in a vertically 
integrated, siloed legacy approach to telecoms.
THE PROBLEM WITH THE 
‘SILOED’ APPROACH
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considering platform markets and interconnected 
systems, and assessing regulatory intervention on 
this basis. K.C. Claffy and David Clark define a 
platform as “a technology providing a set of 
capabilities on top of which many different products 
can be developed and deployed”.15 They use 
Microsoft Windows, iOS and Android as examples of 
platforms, identifying four types (see figure).
Another writer, Johannes Bauer, says platforms 
“enable the assembly of complementary modules 
into the systems needed to create value. In a complex 
socio-technical system such as ICT, multiple 
platforms co-exist.”16 Claffy and Clark discuss the 
role of multi-sided platforms (MSPs) and propose an 
MSP-based model, viewing platforms as constituting 
layers in the communications ecosystem. They argue 
that platform layers are more stable than the layers 
above and below them, and so platforms and 
platform layers provide a better focus for regulation.
Bauer notes that these platform markets allow for 
a high degree of plasticity and generativity, i.e. 
allowing non-traditional players to enter the 
markets, and creating expanded opportunities for 
innovation. MSPs can face multiple markets,  
e.g. a telecoms provider can act as a retail service 
provider, wholesaler of services, and video-on-
demand provider (e.g. in Australia, Optus through 
English Premier League football streaming). The 
focus on innovation has been prominent in recent 
ICT policy in the UK and Australia, and is an equally 
important imperative for telecoms regulation.
Bauer notes that vertical separation is damaging 
to innovation for MSPs, which are able to optimise 
profits by “looking at all related market sides 
simultaneously”. He argues that regulatory policy 
should not only look to one market when regulating 
MSPs, particularly where networks are operating as 
MSPs. Focusing on online platforms to inform 
regulatory policy has been considered in European 
discussion on a consistent regulatory approach to a 
functional single digital market.17,18 That discussion 
has recognised the growing role of platforms, and 
the influence of platform providers across multiple 
regulatory frameworks (e.g. Microsoft, Apple, 
Google). 
TAKING STOCK
The layered model has value in describing the 
communications environment and elements  
being regulated. In particular, it supports an 
understanding of functional separation – separating 
the “physical facilities from the applications and 
content that travel over them”.9 Apart from some 
developments on the role of platforms, this analysis 
has shown that limited recent attention has been 
paid to evolutions and alternatives to the layered 
model as a basis for regulatory policy. And platform 
analysis can be seen as complementary – affording a 
greater understanding of market forces at play for 
multi-sided platforms, economic aspects of 
regulation with the shift to the platform economy, 
and fostering innovation.
However, as demonstrated in this article, changes 
in internet technologies put pressure on the layered 
model, and highlight its inflexibility. Yoo argues 
that “policymakers should adopt a more dynamic perspective that 
allows for the possibility that the optimal layered structure may 
change over time”.5 Many critiques of the layered model are 
speculative, and not based on quantitative or qualitative evidence 
demonstrating negative effects. The literature also omits recent 
discussion of the outcomes of any layered regulatory implementations, 
as the debate was at its height from 2002–2006. 
Related to this dearth of analysis is the absence of alternative 
proposals. One alternative approach involves focusing on a functional, 
rather than a technological view of the layers. Taking this approach, 
the layered model provides a framework for understanding facilities 
and services from a functional, or end-user, perspective. The expansion 
of the model to include devices recognises the importance of the 
consumer experience, and arguably any regulatory framework should 
focus on the consumer experience of communications services, and 
whether consumers are able to perform functions with a high degree 
of availability, privacy and security, and at a reasonable cost.
All of this raises the question of what is the purpose of regulation, 
and how its priorities (for example, the promotion of innovation and 
investment) are to be established. This thinking was part of the ACMA’s 
work in identifying broken8 (and enduring)19 concepts, and it was the 
subject of an important piece of work by Robert Picard and Victor 
Pickard, highlighted also in Intermedia.20 There are significant 
differences between the two approaches, some of which relate to 
territorial and historical variations. In any event, further discussion of 
the value of the layered model – or indeed of any alternative – needs to 
start with the principles underlying regulatory design.
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